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Abstract
Using the achievements of my research group over the last
30+ years, I provide evidence to support two hypotheses:
1. The representation of a problem is often the key to its solu-
tion;
2. Problem representations can be automatically both formed
and repaired.
I focus mainly on mathematical problem solving based on
logical representations, drawing on work in solving mechan-
ics problems in English, assisting ecologists to construct
simulation models, reasoning with diagrams, providing an
analogy-based functional program editor and repairing faulty
mathematical theories and ontologies. I look especially at
the interaction between reasoning and representation, illus-
trating how failures in reasoning can suggest representational
improvements and repairs. Methodologically, interactive sys-
tems can provide a vehicle for focusing on some aspects of
representation construction, while relying on user interaction
to complement automation.
Introduction
This paper recounts a 30+ year personal exploration of
the issues surrounding the automated construction, selec-
tion and repair of representations of knowledge. I see the
automation of these representational processes as a central
problem in automated problem solving and as a much ne-
glected one. In particular, there has been insufcient ex-
ploration of the interaction of reasoning and representation,
especially into how failures of reasoning can suggest the re-
pair of existing representations or the formation of new ones.
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We briey mention some of the subelds of AI that touch on
these issues.
Automated Theorem Proving is nearly always based on a
xed representation: a formal theory drawn from mathe-
matical practice or hand-crafted by the developer. There
has been little exploration of how mathematicians for-
malise informal problem statements or how formal the-
ories are constructed.
Belief Revision has developed mechanisms for the selec-
tive withdrawal of beliefs in order, for instance, to effect a
minimal repair on an inconsistent knowledge base. Truth
Maintenance Systems provide mechanisms for storing
alternate justications for inferred knowledge in order to
propagate the effects of withdrawn or reasserted knowl-
edge in a knowledge base. None of these mechanisms af-
fect what we will call the signature of the knowledge base,
i.e., the functions and predicates with which the knowl-
edge is formulated, together with their arities, types, etc.
Nor do they offer mechanisms for the initial formation
of representations. There has been little investigation of
inference failures not based on inconsistency resolution,
e.g., failures of proof search.
Machine Learning has developed many mechanisms for
forming concepts and rules. Symbolic learning tech-
niques usually use an existing representation to dene
new concepts in terms of old or hypothesise new rules. As
with belief revision and truth maintenance, these mecha-
nisms do not affect the underlying signature of the rep-
resentation. Non-symbolic mechanisms, such as neural
nets, build concept recognisers, but there has been lit-
tle work driving such concept formation by reasoning re-
quirements or failures.
Ontology Matching has developed mechanisms for match-
ing the signature of one representation to that of an-
other. However, most of these mechanisms are restricted
to aligning isa hierarchies (or classications) based on
unary predicates or concepts.
Natural Language Processing has developed mechanisms
for translating utterances in natural languages, such as En-
glish, into formal representations. In the process, ambi-
guities are resolved, requiring the selection of the most
likely representation of the intended meaning. However,
all the alternate representations are usually based on the
same, xed signature and logic.
As you can see from this wide-ranging but supercial sur-
vey, AI has played insufcient attention to where represen-
tations and especially their underlying signatures and logics
come from, or how they are modied when they are found
to be wanting. This may have been sufcient for construct-
ing AI systems to work in circumscribed domains. It will
not be sufcient for building AI systems in open-ended do-
mains, where it is necessary to react to new and unexpected
situations.
In this paper we will explore two hypotheses:
1. The representation of a problem is often the key to its so-
lution;
2. Problem representations can be automatically both
formed and repaired.
I will provide evidence to support these hypotheses, mostly
drawn from the work of my research group since 1975.
However, I start, not with my group’s work, but with the ob-
servations on the art of mathematical problem solving pro-
vided by one of the worlds foremost mathematicians and
most respected mathematical teachers, George P·olya.
How to Solve It
P·olya’s beautiful little book How to Solve It (P·olya 1945)
ought to be a gold mine for automated reasoners. Written
by a world famous mathematician, it provides practical ad-
vice on mathematical problem solving. It has been widely
and successfully used by students of mathematics and re-
lated subjects. It has often been observed that this practical
advice ought to provide insight for those building automated
reasoning and problem-solving computer programs. How-
ever, despite the frequency of these observations, there is re-
markably little AI or automated reasoning research that one
can point to as having been directly inuenced by P·olya1
P·olya’s advice is divided into four parts: understanding
the problem, devising a plan, carrying out the plan and look-
ing back. Each part consists mainly of a series of Socratic
questions that a problem solver should ask him/herself, to-
gether with examples of this technique applied to many
particular problems. Typical questions from each part are:
What is the unknown?, Do you know a related prob-
lem?, Can you see clearly that each step is correct? ,
Can you derive the result differently?. From these exam-
ples we can see some of the difculty in applying P·olya’s
advice. Consider, for instance, each of these questions in
the context of a standard, logic-based, proof system.
• What is the unknown? The problem formulation for a
logic-based prover usually comes with a well-labelled
goal or conjecture, so it is not clear what addressing this
question would add.
1One notable exception is Funt’s MSc project on ruler and com-
pass constructions in geometry (Funt 1973), but this was based
on the very practical hints on this topic in chapter 1 of another
of Po´lya’s books (Po´lya 1965).
• Do you know a related problem? This question suggests
using the proof of an analogous theorem as a guide to con-
struct the proof of the current theorem. There has been pe-
riodic work using this technique. (Owen 1990) provides a
good survey up to 1990. However, such work has seldom
been sustained and has not been very inuential.
• Can you see clearly that each step is correct? The steps of
logic-based problem solvers are typically correct by con-
struction, so this advice has little purchase.
• Can you derive the result differently? Problem solvers
usually work in a search space of possible solutions. It is
technically simple to arrange for this space to be searched
for more than one solution, although it is unclear what
this gains unless you need a solution with some special
property, e.g., optimality, efcient execution, reliability.
These examples questions were selected pretty much at ran-
dom. Similar remarks apply to most of the others.
Why is Po´lya’s advice so helpful to human students and so
unhelpful for automated problem solvers? The resolution
of this paradox, I suggest, is that his advice is mostly aimed
at a different task than that faced by automated problem-
solver designers. Automated problem solvers are typically
designed to work with a xed representation of the world: a
description of the blocks world or the axioms of group the-
ory. This representation denes a search space. The main
issue is how to search this space efciently, e.g., by guiding
search, by removing redundancy from the space, by search-
ing several branches in parallel, by clever indexing to im-
prove look-up times, by space saving techniques, etc. P·olya
has very little to say about any of this.
Much of P·olya’s advice is about representing the prob-
lem in such a way that it can be readily solved, e.g., because
some standard technique applies to it, or it reduces to some
previously solved problem. A formal representation is re-
quired because he assumes that the problem is initially pre-
sented informally. For instance, most of the example prob-
lems in (P·olya 1945) are stated in English with or without
an accompanying diagram.
If, in the light of these observations, we revisit P·olya’s
previous four questions, we can now interpret them in a very
different way.
• What is the unknown? In understanding an informally
stated problem it is vital to identify what is given and what
is sought. P·olya continues by asking us to draw a gure,
introduce notation and write down any conditions  all
vital steps in representing the problem, rather than solving
it.
• Do you know a related problem? If you listen carefully
to uses of analogy in everyday conversation, you will see
that it is rarely using an old argument to guide the search
for a new one. Rather it is suggesting a way of represent-
ing the problem in a way analogous to an existing repre-
sentation. The solution is thereby immediately suggested,
i.e., no search is required.
• Can you see clearly that each step is correct? The so-
lution steps may not have been fully formalised, so may
not be correct by construction. Moreover, we have some
additional reasoning to check: that the problem represen-
tation we have chosen is faithful to the original problem
statement.
• Can you derive the result differently? If a different repre-
sentation of the problem yields the same result, then this
may give us faith in the robustness of the solution to rep-
resentational variations.
Again, similar reasoning applies to most of P·olya’s Socratic
questions. So P·olya reminds us that forming a representation
is a key part of problem solving.
For a good example of the way in which choosing the right
representation can make the solution almost trivial, consider
the mutilated checkerboard problem made popular by John
McCarthy (McCarthy 1964) and illustrated in Figure 1 (a).
An 8×8 checkerboard has two opposite corner squares
removed. Can you cover the resulting mutilated
checkerboard completely with 1× 2 dominoes?
The key to the solution is to colour the two squares of each
domino black and white (see Figure 1). It is then clear that
each domino will cover exactly one black and one white
square of the grid. So, for the dominoes to completely cover
the grid, there must be exactly the same number of black and
white squares in the grid, but the numbers are unequal, since
both the removed corners squares had the same colour.
The mutilated checkerboard consists of an 8 × 8 with
alternately coloured squares, from which the top left
and bottom right squares have been removed. Note that
there are two more white squares than black. Initially,
the 1 × 2 domino pieces are uncoloured. By colour-
ing one square white and one black, we can see that it
is impossible to cover the mutilated checkerboard com-
pletely with dominoes.
Figure 1: The Mutilated Checkerboard Problem
Though it offers a nice example of the power of represen-
tation, examples such as the mutilated checkerboard prob-
lem are not a good vehicle for exploring the automation of
representation formation. They are one-offs. It would be
possible to develop a computer program that could solve this
problem by colouring the grid, recognising that each domino
placement maintained an invariant, then realising that this
invariant was violated in the case of the mutilated grid. How-
ever, it would be too tempting to build this heuristic into the
heart of the program, so that it tried to solve every problem
in this way. What is interesting about the problem is dis-
covering the heuristic, not applying it. We are too far away
from a theory of heuristic discovery for this to be a timely
project. What we need to start this exploration of represen-
tation formation is a domain in which it is routine rather than
exceptional: some foothills in which we can hone our repre-
sentation formation techniques, before we attempt Everest.
In the late 1970s, my group found such a domain.
The Idealization of Real-World Objects in
Mechanics Problem Solving
The six year MECHO Project (1975-81) (Bundy et al.
1979), investigated mechanisms for constructing mathemat-
ical models of a real-world situation. In particular, the
MECHO program solved mechanics problems stated in En-
glish, with examples drawn from the English GCE A-Level,
applied-mathematics papers, intended for 16-18 year old
pre-university entrants. MECHO took mechanics problems
stated in English, parsed them, constructed a semantic repre-
sentation in the form of rst-order logic formulae, extracted
equations from this logical representation and then solved
them.
For instance, consider the pulley problem illustrated
in gure 2. The English sentences from a mechanics
text book were rst represented as rst-order formulae,
such as isa(particle, pb), mass(pb,massb, period1),
measure(massb, b), accel(pb, ab, 270, period1),
given(massb) and sought(ab)2. Standard physical
laws, such as F = M.A, were then instantiated with
expressions from this rst-order representation to form
equations, e.g., massb.g + tensionb = massb.ab. The
choice of physical laws and their instantiation into equations
was controlled by an algorithm we christened The Marples
Algorithm. These equations were then solved, e.g., for
ab in this example, to give the required solution to the
problem. MECHO was applied to a wide range of mechanics
problems: pulleys, motion under constant acceleration,
levers, motion on a smooth path, statics, Hooke’s Law,
moment of inertia, etc.
Constructing mathematical representations of real-world
situations always involves idealization, which Wikipedia3
denes as follows:
“Idealization is the process by which scientific models
assume facts about the phenomenon being modeled that
are certainly false. Often these assumptions are used to
make models easier to understand or solve. Many times
idealizations do not harm the predictive accuracy of the
model for one reason or another. Most debates sur-
rounding the usefulness of a particular model often are
about the appropriateness of different idealizations.”
We can see examples of idealization in the pulley problem in
gure 2. For instance, the weights at the end of the pulleys
are called particles, i.e., objects with mass but no extent;
2Note how, following Po´lya’s advice, MECHO has identified the
given and the unknown of the problem.
3http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealization
“Two particles of mass b and c are connected by a light
string passing over a smooth pulley. Find the accelera-
tion of the particle of mass b.” [Taken from (Humphrey
1957)].
Figure 2: A Simple Mechanics Problem
the string is described as light, i.e., its mass can be ig-
nored; the pulley is described as smooth, i.e., any friction
in its axle can be ignored.
A key part of solving mechanics problems is choosing the
right idealization. For instance, a ship in a relative veloc-
ity problem is usually idealized as a particle on a horizontal
plane, whereas in a specic gravity problem it will be ideal-
ized as a 3D shell oating on a liquid. In forming its initial
rst-order representation of an English problem statement,
MECHO had to decide how to idealize each of the real-world
objects mentioned in the statement. For MECHO, this prob-
lem was made relatively simple because most textbook me-
chanics problems come in fairly readily recognisable types
and the problem type largely determines the appropriate ide-
alizations. Cues in the problem statement, e.g., phrases, such
as pulley system, relative velocity, Archimedes Prin-
ciple, etc., help identify the problem type. Further cues,
light string, smooth pulley, inelastic plane, etc. , help
resolve any remaining ambiguity.
To illustrate how much students come to depend on these
cues, consider the following experiment carried out on fresh-
man physics undergraduates by Andrea diSessa (diSessa
1983). They were posed the following problem.
“If a ball is dropped, it picks up speed and hence kinetic
energy. When the ball hits the floor, however, it stops
(before bouncing upward again). At that instant, there
is no kinetic energy, since there is no motion. Where
did the energy go?” [Taken from (diSessa 1983)]
The answer given by diSessa is:
“The ball and floor are mutually compressed on im-
pact. That compression, just like the compression of a
spring, stores energy in mechanical distortion. That is
where the energy goes when the ball comes to a stop.”
The students had a great deal of difculty discovering this
explanation  or even accepting it when it was explained to
them. Their problem was that conservation-of-energy prob-
lems, such as this, invariably cue an idealization of the ball
as a particle with no extent. With no extent, no compression
is possible. The resolution of the paradox can only come
when this fossilized idealization is rejected and a new one
formed, in which the ball has extent.
In real physics and engineering tasks, as opposed to text-
book, applied-maths problems, idealization is not so fos-
silized, but is a key part of the task. For instance, in (Cohen
1974), Harvey Cohen describes Milko a, so called, dragon
problem that crucially depends on appropriate idealization.
“A milk bottle is allowed to stand so that the cream
rises to the top: this occurs without any change in total
volume. Does the pressure near the base of the bottle
change.” [Taken from (Cohen 1974)]
Many people, posed this question, initially reply that the
pressure is unchanged, which Cohen describes as the
canonical wrong answer. However, this answer would be
right if the milk bottle were idealized as having a uniform
cross-section, as rectangular milk cartons do, for instance.
Getting what Cohen describes as the right answer depends
on idealizing the milk bottle as having a conical (or similarly
shaped) top part (See Figure 3 for a discussion). More such
dragon problems can be found in (Walker 1975). Unfortu-
nately, there is little uniformity in the idealization process in
dragon problems. Each one is a little tour-de-force. Just as
in McCarthy’s mutilated checkerboard problem, this makes
dragon problems an unsuitable domain for an investigation
of idealization.
Diagrams (a) and (b) show the milk bottle before and
after the cream has settled out. Consider a column
of milk which does not touch the sides (so pressure
from the bottle walls need not be taken into account).
The column in (b) contains more cream than the corre-
sponding column in (a), but they both have the same
volume. Since cream is lighter than whey, the base
pressure in (b) is less than in (a). In diagram (c), the
columns have equal proportions whether the cream is
separated out or not, so the pressure is unaffected by
cream separation.
Figure 3: Cohen’s Milko Problem
MECHO’s idealization task was made easier by its fos-
silization within problem classes. However, this made text-
book mechanics problems an unpromising vehicle for ex-
ploring the idealization process. Since idealization is at the
heart of the construction of mathematical models of real-
world situation, this caused us to abandon this domain in
favour of one in which idealization could be properly ad-
dressed.
User-Assisted Idealization in Ecological
Modelling
The six year ECO Project (1983-89) (Robertson et al. 1991),
developed an intelligent front-end for ecological modelling.
The ECO program built an ecological simulation program in
response to a dialogue with a user. From the dialogue it rst
constructed a representation of an ecological situation using
a rst-order sorted logic, then it extracted a Fortran or Pro-
log program using similar methods to the MECHO program.
Ecological simulation models are used to make predictions
about different kinds of intervention in the natural or farm-
ing world, e.g., to avoid undesirable outcomes, optimise in-
terventions, etc. More people could benet from such sim-
ulation models than have the skill to build one themselves
or the resources to have others build one for them. ECO ad-
dresses this issue by allowing unskilled users to build their
own simulation model at low cost. Its user dialogue is con-
ducted in terms of the ecological situation, rather than in
programming or mathematical terms.
Idealization arises in simulation models primarily in the
way that objects are divided up into sub-objects, or not. For
instance, a eld may be divided into different zones, a ock
of sheep into age classes or a tree into roots, trunk, branches,
leaves, etc. This domain provides an ideal next step up from
mechanics textbook problems as a vehicle for investigating
idealization. On the one hand, the types of idealization are
fairly standardized, enabling a pre-dened set of choices.
On the other hand, there is no fossilization of the choices;
they will depend on the user’s needs. For instance, a eld
might be divided into: point locations, with or without prox-
imity relations; locations with area; a grid square; zones; or
left undivided. The user will choose one of these idealiza-
tions depending on the physical characteristics of the eld or
the detail required in the model. The interactive environment
also enabled ECO to provide automated assistance where we
had developed theories about the idealization process, but to
leave the decision to the user where we had no such theories
or where the user wanted to override our theories.
One idealization theory developed in the ECO project was
that objects should be sub-divided when they represented an
independent variable on which some dependent variable de-
pended, and where the user wanted to predict that dependent
variable. For instance, suppose the user wanted to track the
biomass of a pack of wolves. Suppose, further, that wolf
biomass was known, from a previous user interaction, to de-
pend on both age and location. Then ECO would suggest
sub-dividing the wolves into age and location classes. It had
some standard classication methods for both age and loca-
tion, which it would suggest to the user via a menu.
ECO also had standard idealizations for processes, e.g.,
logistic growth, predator-prey equation, competition equa-
tion, interacting objects, etc., which were presented to the
user to choose from. Gaps in the knowledge required to au-
tomate these processes could also serve as a trigger for fur-
ther idealization. For instance, the idealization needed for
the interacting objects process requires a measure of proxim-
ity between the objects that are interacting. In the absence
of such a proximity measure, an appropriate location class
will be triggered.
The interactive context, which enabled us to make partial
progress in our study of idealization, also ultimately inhib-
ited it. Many of the idealization choices must depend on
the user’s goal and knowledge of the world, so could not
be automated except via user interaction. To make further
progress in the automation of idealization, it was necessary
to look for a domain in which the automated agent had both
internal goals and some knowledge about how different rep-
resentations would promote or inhibit the realisation of those
goals. As P·olya has shown, pure mathematics can provide
such a domain. The goal is to prove a theorem and represen-
tations can be objectively tested against this goal.
Diagrammatic Reasoning
For her PhD (1995-1999), Mateja Jamnik developed the DI-
AMOND program: an interactive system which constructs
proofs without words (Jamnik, Bundy, & Green 1999;
Jamnik 2001). The term proofs without words is drawn
from Nelsen’s book (Nelsen 1993), in which theorems of
natural numbers are proved solely using a diagram (see Fig-
ure 4 for an example).
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The diagram gives a proof of the theorem n2 = 1 +
3 + · · ·+ (2n− 1). The diagram can be viewed as de-
scribing both the left and right hand sides of the equa-
tion. The whole square represents n2. Each of the L-
shapes represents one of the odd numbers summed on
the right-hand side.
Figure 4: A Proof without Words
DIAMOND conducts idealization in its choice of diagram-
matic representations of algebraic formulae. For instance, a
square can be represented in at least the following ways:
1. A sequence of rows, each of which is a list of dots.
2. A sequence of columns, each of which is list of dots.
3. A concentric sequence of circumferences, each of which
is a square ring.
4. A nested sequence of ell shapes.
Figure 5 illustrates these options.
The same square is decomposed into (a) rows, (b)
columns, (c) rings and (d) ells.
Figure 5: Alternative Representations of a Square
A successful proof depends crucially on nding appro-
priate idealizations. Most proofs without words work by
mapping each side of the equation to be proved to the same
shape, but idealized in two different ways. For instance, in
the proof illustrated in Figure 4, both sides of the equation
are represented by a square. However, whereas the left-
hand-side of the equation, n2, is idealized using either (1)
or (2), the right-hand-side, 1 + 2 + . . . + (2n − 1) is ideal-
ized using (4).
Currently, DIAMOND requires user interaction to provide
these idealizations implicitly by deconstructing a couple of
example diagrams, e.g., for n = 3 and n = 4. It remains an
unrealised aim to automate this idealization process. Fortu-
nately, there is more hope of complete idealization in this do-
main than there was in the ecological modelling one. Appro-
priate idealization does not depends on some implicit user
requirements for a simulation program, but only on success
in rapid proof of the theorem, for which we have an objec-
tive test. Moreover, we can map certain algebraic operations
onto specic idealizations: multiplication onto idealizations
(1) or (2) of a rectangle; odd numbers onto idealization (4);
8n to idealization (3); etc. These idealizations correspond
to recursive decompositions of the general n-ary diagram.
They are equivalent to constructing an induction rule when
carrying out an inductive proof. A lot is known about how
induction rules can be constructed (Bundy 2001). There is
some hope of adapting that knowledge to this situation.
All the mechanisms described above build representations
of a problem from a xed signature of predicates, functions,
diagrams, etc. But I have argued that we also need to con-
sider how to form and evolve the signatures themselves. We
rst addressed this problem in the context of constructing
new computer programs.
An Analogy Driven Program Editor
For his PhD (1995-1999), Jon Whittle developed the CYN-
THIA program: an analogy-based editor for ML functional
programs, (Whittle et al. 1999; Whittle 1999). CYNTHIA
enables ML programmers to efciently convert an old ML
function into a new one, while being protected from var-
ious syntactic, semantic and termination errors. Powerful
commands are associated with each part of the old function
and provided in drop-down menus. For instance, editing the
type signature of a function also updates all the correspond-
ing patterns in the heads of its denition. An extra argument
added to a function is inserted in all occurrences of that func-
tion. Changing the form of a function’s recursive call is ef-
fected with a single command, but updates all the step and
base cases of that recursive function. Figure 6 gives an ex-
ample session with CYNTHIA.
A function to calculate the length of a list is edited into
a function to count the nodes of a tree. Firstly, the
name of the function is changed from length to count.
Note how all three occurrences are changed. Next,
the type declaration is changed from ′alist → int to
tree → int. Note how the patterns in the heads of the
definitions are automatically updated to the new data-
type, and that a type error is highlighted in red in the
body. Finally, this type error is corrected and the edit
is complete.
Figure 6: A Session with the CYNTHIA Analogy-Based Pro-
gram Editor
Behind the scenes, the function is stored as a proof that
it meets a very weak specication, namely that it has the
correct type. The function is extracted from this verication
proof. Editing commands actually change this underlying
proof, rather than affect the function itself. An editing com-
mand may render the proof invalid. CYNTHIA tries to auto-
matically repair any invalid proof. If it succeeds, then it will
ensure that: the resulting function is syntactically correct;
is neither over nor under-dened; and that it terminates. If
it fails, it will ag up parts of the function that need to be
edited to ensure these properties are true, e.g., that it type
checks properly.
The editing commands can be regarded as effecting a kind
of representational repair or adaptation. Representational re-
pairs range from changing the name of a function, via adding
or subtracting a function’s argument, or changing the type
of a function, through to changing its recursive structure.
CYNTHIA’s role is: to present legal representation change
options to a user; implement those changes that the user se-
lects; and ensure that various desirable properties are main-
tained or any violations are brought to the user’s attention to
be xed.
Belief revision and truth maintenance mechanisms
change a representation by adding and deleting formulae
from a knowledge base. The underlying signature from
which these formulae are constructed remains unchanged.
CYNTHIA shows that one can go beyond this to change
the underlying signature, i.e., effect changes of name, ar-
ity, semantics, type, etc., while maintaining well-formedness
properties such as syntax, well-denedness, termination,
etc.
However, CYNTHIA required user assistance to determine
which signature changes to make. There is an open question
about whether such signature changes can be driven auto-
matically in pursuit of some higher-goal. One possibility is
to react to unexpected failures (or successes) of reasoning to
repair a faulty ontology to make it a better representation of
the world. We explore this possibility in the next two sec-
tions.
Repairing Faulty Theories
For her PhD (2000-06), Alison Pease developed the TM
program: an implementation of ideas of Lakatos (Lakatos
1976) for repairing faulty mathematical theories (Pease et
al. 2004). TM uses Colton’s HR system (Colton, Bundy, &
Walsh 1999; Colton 2002), which formulates concepts and
conjectures by generalising from examples. TM uses HR to
discover conjectures that are nearly true, i.e., have only a
few counter-examples. HR, the Otter theorem prover and the
Mace counter-example nder then interact to rst analyse
the counter-examples and failed proofs, and then to repair
the mathematical theory.
Pease’s work shows that Lakato’s methods of proof and
refutation suggest computationally effective procedures for
automated reasoning, in particular for repairing faulty math-
ematical theories. Lakatos methods, such as piecemeal ex-
clusion, strategic withdrawal and counter-example-barring,
are used automatically to reformulate the original conjec-
ture, redene some of the concepts or repair a failed proof.
This contrasts with our current failure to exploit the advice
of P·olya. But, if as I suggest, we revisit P·olya’s advice
as applying to the formation and repair of representations,
then we will nd that it too suggests effective computational
mechanisms.
TM redenes concepts and reformulates conjectures in
terms of a xed underlying primitives, whereas CYNTHIA
changes the underlying signature. In the next section we see
how signature changes can also be automated.
Dynamic Ontology Repair
For her PhD (2001-06), Fiona McNeill developed the ORS
program: an automated system for repairing faulty ontolo-
gies in response to unexpected failures in plan execution
(Bundy, McNeill, & Walton 2006; McNeill 2005). ORS
forms plans to achieve its goals using the services provided
by other agents. In forming these plans, ORS draws upon
its knowledge base, which represents its world, including its
beliefs about the abilities of other agents and under what cir-
cumstances they will perform various services. To request
actions or ask questions of the other agents, ORS uses a sim-
ple performative language implemented in KIF4, an ontology
language based on rst-order logic.
The representation of the world used by ORS may be
faulty, not just in containing false beliefs, but also in us-
ing a signature that does not match that used by some of its
collaborating agents. This mismatch will inhibit inter-agent
communication, leading to faulty plans that will fail during
execution. ORS analyses its failed plans, communicates with
any agents that unexpectedly refused to perform a service,
and proposes repairs to its ontology, including the signature
of that ontology. Repairs can include: adding, removing or
permuting arguments to predicates or functions, merging or
splitting of predicates or functions and changing their types,
as well as some belief revisions, such as adding or remov-
ing the precondition of an action. The signature repairs are
based on a survey of types of abstraction in AI problem solv-
ing (Giunchiglia & Walsh 1992). It uses not only all these
forms of abstractions, which remove detail from a signature,
but also their inverses, renements that add detail to a sig-
nature. Sometimes a renement is indicated by the analysis,
but cannot be executed due to insufcient knowledge about
the detail to be added.
The ORS project has demonstrated that, in many cases, it
is possible to automate the repair of a faulty signature of a
representation, as well as faulty beliefs represented in that
signature. This ability is vital if we are to build autonomous
agents that can evolve their internal representations to cope
with a complex and changing world. It is unrealistic, for
instance, to assume that innumerable agents comprising the
Semantic Web5 can be organised to share a common ontol-
ogy. They will, for instance, download different versions
and make local customisations. Nor is it realistic to assume
that agents will be able to upload their ontologies to other
agents for analysis and matching. They may not have been
built with this functionality and they may not be willing to
share what might be commercially condential information
4http://logic.stanford.edu/kif/kif.html
5http://www.w3.org/2001/sw/
with a customer or a rival. So only limited channels of com-
munication can be realistically assumed. Currently, we are
adapting and extending this work to a Semantic-Web-like
context in the Open Knowledge project6.
Conclusion
In this paper we set out to establish two hypotheses. We now
survey the evidence we have presented for each of them.
The representation of a problem is often the key to its so-
lution. In his book How to solve it, George P·olya drew
on a lifetime’s experience of mathematical problem-solving,
at the highest level, to pass on the skills he had acquired.
As we have seen, a large part of his problem-solving advice
centres on the formation of representations that will simplify
the problem-solving task. In the mutilated checkerboard and
Milko problems, we have seen the central role that represen-
tation plays. In diSessa’s experiments on freshman physics
students, we can see how the choice of an inappropriate rep-
resentation can render a problem insoluble. In our MECHO
project, we saw that the appropriate idealization of a prob-
lem was crucial to its solution, but that the idealization task
had been made unrealistically easy by the fossilization of the
link between problem type and idealization. Such fossiliza-
tion can cause us to underestimate the central role that rep-
resentation plays outside the articial world of the applied-
maths textbook. In our DIAMOND project, we saw how the
choice of diagrammatic sub-structure was the key step in
making the truth of a mathematical identity immediate from
the diagram. In our ORS project, we saw that a mismatch
between a representation and the world in which it operates
led to failures of plan execution.
Problem representations can be automatically both
formed and repaired. In the Mecho project we saw how
two successive representations of an informally stated prob-
lem could be automatically formed using a combination of
natural language processing technology, appropriate ideal-
ization and the Marples Algorithm. The success of the sub-
sequent problem-solving process demonstrated the success
of this automatic representation formation. However, the
key idealization process was made unrealistically easy due
to its fossilization in this domain. The ecological mod-
elling domain provided a more realistic idealization chal-
lenge. Idealization of ecological objects was more typical
of regular, real-world problem solving, varying signicantly
within sub-domains, but being drawn from standard kinds.
The task of selecting from among these idealization options
could be partially automated, but ultimately required human
intervention in order that the simulation model would meet
human dened specications. The DIAMOND project also
used human intervention to select appropriate diagrammatic
idealizations of algebraic expressions. However, in this do-
main, there is some hope that this process could be totally
automated since the goal this idealization has to solve, prov-
6http://www.openk.org/
ing a theorem, is more circumscribed. This is unnished
business.
So far, these mechanisms have constructed representa-
tions from a xed signature. But to provide the represen-
tational autonomy required of an intelligent agent, it is also
necessary to include signature formation and repair. In the
CYNTHIA project, we explored the space of signature ma-
nipulation: changing function names, changing their types
and arities, changing their recursive structure, etc. These
changes were under human direction, but with the machine
maintaining some properties of syntactic correctness, well-
denedness and termination. In the HR project we showed
how new concepts and conjectures could be automatically
formed by generalising from examples. In the TM project
we used HR in a more directed way, to repair faulty theo-
ries in order to make a nearly true conjecture be totally true.
In the ORS project we showed how even the signature un-
derlying a representation could be automatically repaired to
improve its t to the situation it was modelling.
A complete proof of this second hypothesis is unnished
business. The work described above provides partial and en-
couraging evidence, but a lot more remains to be done. Rep-
resentational manipulation has been a neglected area of AI.
It is a hard problem, but a critical one if we are to create truly
autonomous agents able to react to new and unexpected sit-
uations. Such agents will need to form new representations
of new worlds to solve new problems. They will have to
modify and repair their existing representations to cope with
a changing world with changing demands. These modi-
cations will need to go beyond the addition and removal of
facts and rules from a knowledge base. It will be necessary
also to modify the signature of the formalism, maybe also
its semantics and its logic. Finding mechanisms to automate
these formation and modication processes will be one of
the major goals of the next 50 years of AI.
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